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It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's the FAA: Government
Liability for Negligent Airworthiness Certification
By Lawrence Yale Iser*
On October 4, 1960, Eastern Airlines Flight 375 began its take-off
from Logan Airport in Boston. The Lockheed Electra airplane en-
countered a flock of starlings about 6/10ths of a mile from the begin-
ning of the runway. Some of the birds were ingested by the engines,
causing the number one engine to flame-out and shut off. Forty-seven
seconds after take-off the plane went into a steep left bank and crashed
into the harbor. Fifty-nine passengers and three crew members were
killed.
One of the tests required for airworthiness certification of the
Lockheed Electra was the "chicken test," in which the carcasses of four
pound chickens were injected into engines intended for use in the air-
plane to determine the effects of bird ingestion upon the structural
components of the engine. When the chicken test was performed, it
was discovered that at specified speeds bird ingestion internally dam-
aged the engine, resulting in a loss of power. Notwithstanding the test
results, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) issued an un-
restricted Type Certificate for the engine, approving the engine's design
for use in commercial aviation.'
On October 24, 1947, a United Airlines DC-6 was cruising over
Bryce Canyon, Utah when the captain noticed that the plane's fuel
tanks were not emptying evenly. To balance the load, he opened the
cross-feed and activated the appropriate fuel-boost pumps. When he
checked the results of the procedure, he found that one tank had over-
flowed, and was pumping fuel through the air vent. The fuel, captured
by the airflow over the wings, was fed directly into the cabin heater air
scoop, and when the heater automatically cycled on, an uncontrollable
fire was triggered. The aircraft exploded, killing fifty-two. Three
weeks later, on November 11, 1947, a similar accident involving an-
other DC-6 occurred at Gallup, New Mexico.
2
* B.A., 1976, The University of Michigan. Member, Third Year Class.
1. Rapp v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), vacatedby agreement, 521
F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1970). See notes 77-94, 150 & accompanying text infra.
2. See DeVito v. United Air Lines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). The DeVito
action was not based upon these accidents, but rather on fire-fighting systems that were
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The Douglas DC-6 first became operational in July, 1947. During
the design stages of the DC-6, federal certification regulations stated:
"It shall not be possible for fuel to flow between tanks in quantities
sufficient to cause an overflow . . . . [V]ents and [fuel] drainage shall
not terminate at points where the discharge of fuel will constitute a fire
hazard." 3 The Civil Aeronautics Administration inspectors, ignoring a
flagrant violation of these regulations, certified the DC-6 as airworthy
for commercial aviation.
On October 8, 1968, a twin-engine DeHavilland-Dove crashed in
Las Vegas during a scheduled air taxi flight between San Diego and
Las Vegas. 4 The applicable certification regulations require support for
fuel lines,5 require high quality materials and workmanship, 6 require a
remote shutoff device for the fuel line, 7 and establish a step-by-step
procedure for reviewing and inspecting fuel line installations. 8 The
cause of the crash was determined to be a fire, ignited when gasoline
escaped through a leak in an untreated copper portion of the fuel lines.
This fuel line had been exposed to intense heat because the mounting
and support of the line by the manufacturer had been inadequate. 9
The aircraft nevertheless had been certified as airworthy by the Federal
Aviation Administration.
These and similar aviation accidents raise the question of whether
the government can and should be held liable under the Federal Tort
Claims Act' 0 (FTCA) for the negligent certification of aircraft and
dangerous to the crew. The many actions brought following the accidents at Bryce Canyon
and Gallup were settled prior to trial. For a dramatic description of the Bryce Canyon
accident, see B. POWER-WATERS, SAFETY LAST: THE DANGERS OF COMMERCIAL AVIA-
TION-AN INDICTMENT BY AN AIRLINE PILOT 199-200 (1972).
3. These regulations are codified presently at 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.957, 23.967 (1978).
4. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, Civ. No. 70-138 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1975),
appeal docketed, No. 76-2813-17 (9th Cir. July 30, 1975).
5. 14 C.F.R. § 23.993(a) (1978).
6. 14 C.F.R. § 23.603 (1978).
7. 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.951, 23.995 (1978).
8. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.951-.1001 (1978).
9. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, Civ. No.
70-138 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 76-2813-17 (9th Cir. July 30, 1975).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a)-(b) (1976). Most actions against the United States in tort are
brought under the FTCA. However, for maritime torts jurisdiction against the government
in the federal courts is based not on the FTCA, but rather on the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976), which provides the exclusive remedy in admiralty against the
United States for maritime torts. In fact, the two leading airworthiness certification cases,
Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), and Arney v. United
States, 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973), both were brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
For this reason, the FTCA defenses of discretionary function and misrepresentation were
not considered. See notes 54, 92-95 & accompanying text infra. In Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), however, the Supreme Court held that federal
admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to aviation tort claims arising from flights between
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components, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958" (Act), and
the Federal Aviation Regulations promulgated thereunder12 by the
Federal Aviation Administration 3 (FAA). Since the enactment of the
FTCA, which relinquished the federal government's long-standing sov-
ereign immunity from liability in tort, there have been numerous law-
suits for injuries and wrongful death arising from aviation accidents. A
majority of the cases involved the negligence of air traffic controllers.14
The issue of the government's liability under the FTCA, however, has
been raised in a variety of other circumstances as well, including expo-
sure of homeowners to sonic booms,' 5 excessive noise from airplanes,
16
negligent denial of pilot certification, 17 and suits between parties where
federal jurisdiction was sought.' 8 In each situation, liability generally
has been imposed. Government liability for the negligent airworthi-
ness certification of aircraft, however, is one area which remains unset-
tled.
Certification of an airplane or component part as airworthy is a
three step procedure involving: 19 (1) Type Certification, which ap-
proves the design of the component;20 (2) Production Certification,
points within the continental United States, thereby eliminating the Suits in Admiralty Act
as a source of federal jurisdiction in cases such as Rapp.
11. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, as amended by 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
12. 14 C.F.R. §§ 1-199 (1978).
13. The statutory framework of the Federal Aviation Administration is as follows: The
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), as amendedby Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726,72 Stat. 731, as amended by 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976),
established the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), which became the Federal Aviation Agency in 1966, under the Department of
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1659 (1976).
14. See notes 41-49, 82-91, 140, 143 & accompanying text infra.
15. Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gravelle, 407
F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1969).
16. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946).
17. Duncan v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1167 (D.D.C. 1973).
18. Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that the
safety provisions of the Act imposed a duty on the defendant-carrier to perform its services
with the "highest possible degree of safety in the public interest").
19. While an exhaustive survey of this procedure is not possible here, an excellent sum-
mary is contained in Kennelly, Aviation Accidents-Liability of Manufacturers-Part II, 18
TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 265, 272-82 (1975). The Federal Aviation Act gives the administra-
tor of the FAA the responsibility for aviation safety through the promulgation of a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme. 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976). The administrator has both an express
authorization to regulate the aviation industry by establishing minimum safety standards,
rules, and regulations, and a broad grant of power to establish any regulation necessary to
provide for safety in air commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1976). To market its product, the
manufacturer of the airplane or component must satisfy the certification requirements pre-
scribed by the Federal Aviation Act and the Federal Aviation Regulations. 49 U.S.C.
§ 1423 (1976).
20. 49 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(2) (1976); 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11-.53 (1978). The manufacturer
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which approves the manufacturing process and quality control; 2' and
(3) Airworthiness Certification, which gives final governmental ap-
proval for the use of the component in commercial aviation. 22 Govern-
mental negligence in any step of this certification procedure, when the
proximate cause of injury or death from an aviation accident, may give
rise to a private action against the government under the Act.
The government commonly asserts three defenses in actions alleg-
ing negligent certification: (1) that no actionable duty is owed to indi-
vidual claimants or their decedents under the Act;23 (2) that the
"discretionary function" exception to liability under the FTCA bars re-
covery; 24 and (3) that the "misrepresentation" exception to the FTCA
encompasses and precludes FAA liability premised on negligent certifi-
cation.25 This Note examines the government's defenses in relation to
the existing cases of negligent certification, and concludes that where
negligent certification is the proximate cause of injury or death, the
government can and should be held liable.
initially submits the design and performance data required by the FAA to determine
whether the design of the aircraft meets FAA standards. The Type Certificate may be issued
only upon proof that the design of the component meets detailed standards for operation, air
safety, material, and performance. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11-.53 (1978).
21. The regulations specify the manner in which materials are purchased and establish
quality control testing and inspection procedures. 14 C.F.R. § 21.143 (1978). The manufac-
turer may obtain a Production Certificate upon manufacturing product models in conform-
ity with the specifications approved by the Type Certificate. 49 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1976); 14
C.F.R. §§ 21.131-.165 (1978). Various safety regulations and quality control standards are
imposed upon the manufacturer before the aircraft is assembled as a finished product. 14
C.F.R. §§ 21.139, 21.143 (1978). The Production Certificate must be possessed by each man-
ufacturer for any aircraft or component part which is marketed. Otherwise the manufac-
turer will be unable to obtain an Airworthiness Certificate without further testing and
inspection or, in the case of component parts, may not install the part on any certificated
aircraft. 14 C.F.R. § 21.163 (1978).
22. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.171-.199 (1978). A manufacturer operating under a standard Pro-
duction Certificate is entitled to the Airworthiness Certificate with no further showing except
for an inspection to determine whether the product is in conformity with the Type Certifi-
cate, and whether the product is in proper condition for safe operation. 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c)
(1976); 14 C.F.R. § 21.183(b) (1978). The operation of any aircraft in air commerce without
a current airworthiness certificate, or in violation of the terms of the certificate, is forbidden.
49 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(1) (1976); see Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942)
(affirming the imposition of civil penalties for the operation of a civil aircraft without a
current airworthiness certificate.) A person who desires to make a major change in the de-
sign of the aircraft by modification must obtain a Supplemental Type Certificate if the de-
sign no longer conforms to the design approved by the original Type Certificate. 14 C.F.R.
§§ 21.111-.1 19 (1978). If a manufacturer desires to make a major change in the product, the
original Type Certificate must be amended. 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1978).
23. See note 26 & accompanying text infra.
24. See notes 69-117 & accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 118-59 & accompanying text infra.
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The Question of Duty
Claims against the United States for the negligent acts or omis-
sions of its agents are governed by the provisions of the FTCA.26 In
interpreting the FTCA, the courts have established that "if the Govern-
ment undertakes to perform certain acts or functions thus engendering
reliance thereon, it must perform them with due care; [and] that [the]
obligation of due care extends to the public and the individuals who
compose it .... "27
The issue of whether FAA safety regulations impose a duty of due
care, the breach of which is actionable, has been considered in the con-
text of many aviation problems, but nevertheless remains in conten-
tion.28 In products liability cases, 29 air controller negligence cases,
30
and more recently in airworthiness certification cases,31 the existence of
such a duty has been recognized by the courts on the basis of the Act
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679 (a)-(b) (1976). The FTCA is a limited waiver of the sovereign
immunity of the United States for the "negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the [government] while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable . . . ." 28
U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2674 (1976).
27. Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1956); Gibbs v. United States, 251
F. Supp. 391, 400 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); see Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1150
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
28. The leading opponents of the imposition of a duty of due care have maintained that
the Act cannot give rise to civil liability. J. Harrison & P. Kolczynski, Government Liability
for Certfication of Aircraft, 44 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW & COMMERCE 23, 29 [hereinafter
cited as Harrison & Kolczynski]. Interestingly, both authors are attorneys for the Office of
the Chief Counsel for the FAA. Author Harrison, as Assistant Chief Counsel, represented
the government in Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975), see notes
100-02 & accompanying text infira, and Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 429 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.
Tenn. 1977), see notes 154-59 & accompanying text infra. Their comprehensive Article vig-
orously defends nonliability for negligent certification. Despite the authors' employer, their
position must be considered unofficial.
In addition, the Act has been held to imply private remedies based on regulatory stat-
utes. Note, The Decline of the Implied Private Cause afAction Continued- The Third Circuit
Construes the FederalAviation Act, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 41 (1978). See also United Scottish
Ins. Co. v. United States, Civ. No. 76-158 (S.D. Cal. April 2, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 76-
2813-17 (9th Cir. July 30, 1975).
29. Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971).
For a discussion of the Berkebile case see notes 36-39 & accompanying text infra.
30. Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); Dickens v. United States, 378
F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Tex. 1974), afrd, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977); Dreyer v. United States,
349 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (controller negligently misidentified an airplane carrying
skydivers and proximately caused skydivers to jump into Lake Erie instead of an airfield);
Hennesey v. United States [19711 12 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 17,410 (failure to advise aircraft of
departure from required flight path); Stork v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Cal.
1967), afI'd, 430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970).
31. See notes 50-68 & accompanying text infra.
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itself. Congress, recognizing that the nature of air carriage demanded
uniform rules of operation, 32 promulgated the Act to centralize and
unify the federal government's efforts to provide safety. 33 As a result,
the courts consistently have construed the Act as preempting state regu-
lation of safety in air navigation. 34 In light of this preemption, and
because federal regulations have the full force and effect of federal
law,35 courts have imposed upon the government the duty to perform
these regulatory activities in a reasonably diligent manner and have
imposed liability when the activities are performed negligently.
Government safety regulations have been recognized repeatedly as
a partial basis for a standard of care. In Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter
Corp. ,36 for example, the defendant manufacturer was held strictly lia-
ble for a dangerous design defect which failed to provide the pilot suffi-
cient time in which to autorotate37 the blades in the event of a power
failure. Because the helicopter had satisfied the minimum certification
requirements and had been certified as airworthy by the FAA, liability
was premised solely on the manufacturer's failure to take additional
precautions to prevent an unreasonably dangerous condition. 38 How-
ever, the court noted in dictum that
[t]he Federal Aviation Agency's standards are far from meaningless.
Considering the pre-eminence of the federal government in the field
of air safety and the importance and standing of the FAA we would
incline to the view that failure of the manufacturer to comply with
the regulations would be negligence per se. Our view is strengthened
by the fact that the FAA is empowered to lay down minimum stan-
dards and violation of such standards, if the proximate cause of the
32. S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1958); H.R. REP. No. 2556, 85th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1958).
33. S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. REP. 2556, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958); Air Lines Pilot Ass'n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960). The court stated:
"The Federal Aviation Act was passed by Congress for the purpose of centralizing in a
single authority . . . the power to frame rules for the safe and efficient use of the nation's
airspace." Id. at 894 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d
1401 (9th Cir. 1969), where the court noted that the purpose of the Act was to "create and
enforce one unified system of flight rules." Id. at 1404.
34. Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974); Village of Ben-
senville v. City of Chicago, 16 Ill. App. 3d 733, 306 N.E.2d 562 (1973).
35. Stanley v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 973 (N.D.Ohio 1965); Lange v. Nelson-Ryan
Flight Service, Inc., 108 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1961).
36. 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971).
37. When the engine of an airborne helicopter stops, the helicopter will fall to the
ground unless the blades are placed in autorotation. If the blades are placed in autorotation,
their angle differs from that of their angle at flight, and they continue to revolve, and the
helicopter may be guided to a safe landing. If the blades are not put in autorotation, they
may be snapped off in the air as the plane falls by hitting against stops which are necessary
for their control while on the ground. Id. at 709.
38. Id. at 710.
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injury should submit the violator to liability.
39
Although Berkebile and similar cases40 have not involved the govern-
ment as a party, they serve to illustrate the importance of government
safety regulations in setting minimum standards of care in the aviation
industry.
A second line of cases, which did involve the government as a
party, arose from accidents caused by the negligence of air traffic con-
trollers. In these cases, the courts have shaped a duty of due care based
in part on the provisions of the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual
of the FAA (ATCPM). The rulings are based on the rationale that
when the government undertakes to perform services, which in the ab-
sence of specific legislation would not be required, it will be liable for
negligent performance of those services.
41
One such case, Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,42 involved a crash
during an attempted landing on a runway engulfed by swirling fog.
The complaint alleged that the controller who had failed to report a
reduction in visibility from one mile to three-quarters of a mile was
negligent in not providing the pilot with accurate and up-to-date
weather information. The government claimed that the controller was
under no obligation to inform the crew because the airplane's mini-
mum landing requirement was one-half mile. The court, relying on a
provision of the ATCPM which required the tower to furnish "a report
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. See Manos v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (non-
conformity of thrust reverser system with Civil Air Regulations held to be evidence of a
breach of duty); Maynard v. Stinson, [1937] 1 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 1 698 (manufacturer's
failure to provide adequate drains for loose gasoline in violation of Department of Com-
merce regulations).
41. Hartz v. United States 387 F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 1968); Ingham v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967). Actually, the
courts need not rely on the provisions of the ATCPM. The common law duty of due care
imposed upon the air traffic controller is much greater than the duty the courts have shaped
around the manual. In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.),
af'dsub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955), the controllers failed
to issue to an Eastern plane a timely warning of the presence of a P-38 on final approach and
failed to warn the P-38 that Eastern was on final approach. This failure to warn of the traffic
was held to be actionable negligence under the FTCA. See text accompanying notes 80-82
infra. In United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 379
U.S. 951 (1964), the court held that the failure of the CAA to notify United of the existence
of Air Force maneuvers in the airway through which the United plane was flying constituted
actionable negligence. See text accompanying notes 83-85 infra. In Maryland v. United
States, 257 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1966), the court held that the controllers were guilty of
actionable negligence in failing to observe sufficiently and transmit timely warnings of the
presence of a United States T-33 jet in the vicinity of a Capital Airlines Viscount.
While a violation of an express regulation of the ATCPM undoubtedly is easier to
prove, the common law duty to act reasonably imposes a greater burden on the air traffic
controller.
42. 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
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of current weather conditions, and subsequent changes, as necessary,
.. ."43 held that a reasonable interpretation of the section required the
controller to report a twenty-five per cent drop in visibility, and that the
omission constituted actionable negligence. 44
As a result of this decision, the controller's duty under the Act is
not confined solely to the narrow limits of the ATCPM,45 but is subject
to the additional, judicially-inferred requirement of reasonableness.
The Act, in giving the FAA supervision over commercial flight, im-
poses a duty upon the FAA to act reasonably in all activities involving
flight safety.46 The ATCPM is not determinative of, but merely a
guideline for, what is to be considered a minimum standard of care.
Thus, while a violation of an express regulation constitutes negligence
per se, strict adherence to the regulation does not always satisfy the
FAA's obligation of due care.47 For example, courts have held that in
emergency situations, when a controller realizes that the first warning
has gone unheeded, a second warning must be issued.48 Similarly, con-
trollers owe a duty to warn a pilot that the visibility at an airport is
below the take-off minimum for the aircraft, and that the flight is for-
bidden by FAA regulations, even though no such warning is specifi-
cally required by the ATCPM.
49
The same reasons which underlie the imposition of liability for the
negligent contravention of air safety regulations in products liability
actions and air traffic control cases apply in cases of negligent airwor-
43. Id. at 233; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCE-
DURES MANUAL § 265.2 (1961).
44. 373 F.2d at 235.
45. Id.; Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
46. As the courts have gone beyond the literal provisions of the ATCPM, the status of
the law is that of the common law burden of due care in all activities. Courts prefer to rely
on a contravention of a specific regulation, if possible, to bring the liability expressly under
the Act. Nevertheless, as illustrated in note 41 supra, courts have had little difficulty furnish-
ing a remedy under the FTCA even in the absence of a specific contravened regulation.
47. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
48. Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965), afifd, 381 F.2d 965
(9th Cir. 1967). See notes 86-91 & accompanying text infra. See Hamilton v. United States,
497 F.2d 370, 375 (9th Cir. 1974). In the recent case of Miller v. United States, 587 F.2d 991,
995 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit limited Furumizo: "Furumizo did not establish a per
se rule that a controller was to issue two warnings any time there was wake turbulence. The
duty to give a second warning arose when the controller has knowledge that the airplane
faces an extreme danger or severe hazard from wake turbulence, such as when the controller
observes the plane begin to take off toward the turbulence immediately after he or she has
given a cautionary warning. This additional duty which arises with the knowledge of the
extreme danger or severe hazard has been appropriately described as an 'emergency situta-
tion.' " Id. at 995.
49. Stork v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1104 (9th
Cir. 1970).
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thiness certification. For example, in Gibbs v. United States,50 a wrong-
ful death action based upon the crash of a South Central Airlines jet,
plaintiff alleged government negligence in the recertification of the air-
plane after it had been modified. The government denied any negli-
gence, contending that the crash was caused by pilot error in
overloading the aircraft and in mispositioning the cargo. The govern-
ment also urged that if negligence on the part of the FAA were found,
such negligence would not support a cause of action by the plaintiff.
The court disagreed in dicta, noting instead that "[h]aving decided to
enter the broad field of the regulation of the flight and repair and modi-
fications of aircraft, . . . the Government becomes responsible for the
care with which those activities are conducted."' 5' While the court ulti-
mately held that FAA negligence was not the proximate cause of the
accident, 52 the clear implication of the holding was that if causation
had been shown, the government would have been liable.
5 3
The dicta in Gibbs surfaced as the holding in Rapp v. Eastern Air-
50. 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
51. Id. at 400. This logic is based on the famous case of Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), in which the Supreme Court held that where the Coast Guard
assumed the duty of providing navigational aid by maintaining and operating a lighthouse,
it would be liable to the same extent as a private individual if it negligently allowed the light
to burn out.
52. 251 F. Supp. at 401.
53. Because no proximate cause was found the government claims that this oft-cited
language of Gibbs is mere dicta. Harrison & Kolczynski, supra note 28, at 31. While the
quotation is technically dicta, this by no means diminishes the soundness and persuasiveness
of its logic.
The Gibbs opinion also rebuts the government's contention that liability for negligent
certification makes the government an insurer against injuries from negligently manufac-
tured airplanes. Harrison & Kolczynski, szupra note 28, at 43. This argument only obfus-
cates the basic issue. A manufacturer is generally held strictly liable in tort for a dangerously
defective product. The suit against the United States for negligent certification is not a prod-
ucts liability action at all, but rather alleges the negligence of an FAA inspector who failed to
apply the regulations properly, and erroneously labeled the aircraft "airworthy." Thus, a
plaintiff may not sue the United States because of a defectively manufactured airplane, if it
was properly certificated according to regulatory standards. See, e.g., Berkebile v. Brantley
Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971), discussed at notes 36-39
supra, where a helicopter was properly certified by the FAA, but was held to have an unrea-
sonably dangerous design defect.
Further, the government is not an insurer because, as Gibbs demonstrates, the negli-
gence of the government either will have to supersede or equal that of the manufacturer
before it will result in liability for the government. As the court in Gibbs emphasized:
"[T]he government. . . does not become an insurer. Its liability is subject to the same re-
quirements of negligence and causation as would affect the liability of a private person in
the same circumstances." 251 F. Supp. at 400.
The FTCA expressly states that the government is to be treated as a "private person."
This concept is emphasized in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62
(D.C.Cir. 1955), where the court held that when the United States entered the business of
operating a civilian airport and the control tower it assumed a role which might have been
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lines, Inc. ,54 the bird ingestion case described in the introduction. Al-
though the CAA knew from its own airworthiness testing that the
engines were incapable of ingesting birds on take-off, it failed to pre-
scribe in the Type Certificate that the engines were not to be used in
areas where birds were known to congregate.5 5 Although the opinion
was vacated by agreement, 56 the court's holding of government liability
was soundly premised on section 142 157 of the Act, which imposed on
the Administrator of the CAA58 the duty "to promote safety of flight of
civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing . . . [certain] minimum
standards governing design . . . and performance of aircraft," 59 and
requires that these duties be performed "in such a manner as will best
tend to reduce or eliminate the possibility of, or recurrence of, acci-
dents in air transportation. '60 The court found that these provisions
imposed upon the CAA a duty to promote safety by prescribing and
periodically revising standards governing the design and performance
of aircraft engines. 6' In so doing, the CAA was to consider the duty of
air carriers to perform their services with the highest possible degree of
safety. In sum, the CAA was required to reduce or eliminate accidents
in air transportation wherever possible. The court concluded that CAA
certification of the Electra, in light of that airplane's failure of the
assumed by private interests. Thus, the government was liable under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, just as a private party would be.
54. 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), vacated by agreement, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir.
1970). Rapp was the first airworthiness case which actually held the government liable for
its negligence in certification. Rather than appeal this important decision, the government
engaged in extensive settlement negotiations, with the apparent motive of "burying" the
decision, so that it would not set what the government viewed as a dangerous precedent for
future cases. In exchange for the government money, plaintiff stipulated to vacate the lower
court decision. The government sought to keep the case report unpublished, but fortunately
was unsuccessful. Whatever happened during these settlement negotiations did not dimin-
ish the soundness of the court's reasoning. Rapp has been cited in some of the major cases.
See, e.g., Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1973); Marival, Inc. v. Planes,
Inc., 306 F. Supp. 855, 860 (N.D. Ga. 1969). Jurisdiction in Rapp was based on the Suits in
Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976), and not on the FTCA. Thus, the FTCA de-
fenses of discretionary function and misrepresentation were not considered. This, of course,
does not change the question of duty which arises under the Act regardless of how jurisdic-
tion was granted. See notes 92-95 & accompanying text infra.
55. 264 F. Supp. at 680-81.
56. See note 54 supra.
57. 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976) (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 551 (1951)).
58. Under the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1659 (1976), the
functions of the FAA were transfered from the Department of Defense to the Department of
Transportation. The Secretary of Transportation was given ultimate authority over FAA
activities.
59. 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976) (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 551 (1951)).
60. Id.
61. 264 F. Supp. at 680.
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chicken test, violated this statutory duty.62 Although the Rapp opinion
was vacated, and the government not surprisingly has denounced its
precedential value accordingly,63 the logic and reasoning of the court
cannot be ignored.
The reasoning of the Rapp opinion was followed in the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision in Arney v. United States.64 Arney in-
volved a claim against the United States for negligent certification of a
ferry fuel system 65 which caused an airplane to crash into the ocean.
The court held that because the federal government had assumed the
responsibility for aircraft safety by its airworthiness certification, liabil-
ity would be imposed for negligently performing its duties:
The Civil Aeronautics Act, the predecessor to the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, was enacted, and regulations promulgated thereunder,
to promote civil aviation while assuring maximum safety in the
air .... The purpose of the certification of aircraft under the 1958
Act and regulations was to reduce accidents, and the government
may be liable for negligence in improper issuance of a type airwor-
thiness certificate.
66
This case is of particular significance as the Ninth Circuit court is now
deciding the latest negligent certification action.67
The proposition that FAA safety activities, including certification,
62. Id. at 680-81.
63. See, e.g., Harrison & Kolczynski, supra note 28, at 32.
64. 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973). Jurisdiction in Arney, as in Rapp, was based not on
the FTCA, but on the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-742 (1976). This does not
alter the consideration of duty under the Act. See note 54 supra, and notes 92-95 & accom-
panying text infra. The reasoning of Rapp apparently was followed in the unreported case
of Ciccarelli v. United States, Civ. No. S-1940 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 1972), citedin Harrison &
Kolczynski, supra note 28, at 33-34. In Ciccarell, a wrongful death action arising from an
aircrash, plaintiffs alleged negligent issuance of the Type, Production, and Airworthiness
Certificates. The issue of an actionable duty was raised by the government's motion to dis-
miss. The government claimed that the Act was designed to protect only the public as a
whole, and that no actionable duty was owed to individuals. The plaintiffs agreed that the
Act was designed to protect the general flying public, but asserted that the duty imposed on
the FAA by the Act extended to individuals, including aircraft pilots, owners, and passen-
gers. The court agreed with the plaintiffs and denied the government's motion.
65. A ferry fuel system is a long range fuel system which is added to increase the fuel
capacity for a long overwater flight. In this case, appellants were hired to fly the airplane
from California to Vietnam. The ferry system added 200 gallons of gasoline to the original
140 gallon capacity. The FAA inspector insisted that the auxiliary system be vented out the
bottom of the aircraft, contrary to the custom of venting out the top, with the result that the
system failed to deliver all of the fuel. The court reversed the summary judgment for the
government, and held that there was a material issue of fact as to the inspector's negligence.
479 F.2d at 655.
66. Id. at 658.
67. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, Civ. No. 70-138 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1975),
a.peal docketed, No. 76-2813-17 (9th Cir. July 30, 1975). See text accompanying notes 4-9
supra. The cases differ in that jurisdiction in Arney was based on the Suits in Admiralty
Act, rather than the FTCA, and thus the FTCA defenses were not considered. This, of
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impose a duty of due care upon the FAA, the breach of which is action-
able, is thus supported by both logic and authority. The government,
however, is not a guarantor of safety, nor an insurer. It does not guar-
antee safety because the regulations themselves, if reasonably adminis-
tered, are not actionable. As the court in Gibbs correctly pointed out,
FTCA liability is based on the same considerations as the liability of
any private person. The clear impact of the case law, however, is that
the government cannot escape liability for the negligent conduct of its
agents in airworthiness certification by alleging that such agents are
under no actionable duty of care.
68
A Discretionary Function?
The FTCA provides a number of exceptions 69 to the general
waiver of government immunity. Historically, the most important of
these exceptions in aviation accident litigation is that which precludes
governmental liability for actions which are within the "discretionary
function or duty" of any federal agency or employee. 70 In Dalehite v.
United States,7' the Supreme Court discussed in general terms the type
of discretionary decision which, although abusive or negligently made,
would not support an action against the government. The discretion
protected is that of "the executive or the administrator to act according
to [his/her] judgment of the best course .... "72 The Court empha-
sized that this "includes more than the initiation of programs and activ-
ities. It also includes determinations made by executives or
administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of oper-
ations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is
discretion. '73 The Court concluded that "acts of subordinates in carry-
course, would make no difference in resolving the question of duty. See notes 94-95 & ac-
companying text infra.
68. A fitting conclusion to this section is found in the words of the court in Gabel v.
Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972): "If the ... repetitive emphasis by
Congress on safety does not refer to the safety of individuals and does not impose a duty, the
violation of which is a tortious or actionable wrong, then one is led to wonder just whose
safety Congress was talking about, or if there is some safety that is in the public interest
which does not include the saving of human lives. So often, unfortunately, lawyers and
judges overlook the fundamentals. There could not be a plainer creation of a duty to pro-
vide safety than is set forth in the Act and the regulations, and plainly Congress intended to
grant remedies for the wrongs prohibited . Id. at 617 (emphasis by the court).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). This defense has been soundly defeated in most actions
alleging negligence of FAA employees. In the latest negligent certification action, United
Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, Civ. No. 70-138 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1975), appeal docketed,
No. 76-2813-17 (9th Cir. July 30, 1975), the government has not raised the issue on appeal.
71. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
72. Id. at 34.
73. Id. at 35-36.
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ing out the operations of government in accordance with official direc-
tions cannot be actionable. ' 74 Thus, only conduct of subordinate
government agents not in accordance with official directions is actiona-
ble.
The distinction announced by the Supreme Court in Dalehite be-
tween discretionary or planning decisions, for which there can be no
recovery, and operational or ministerial decisions, for which recovery is
permitted, has proven problematic to the courts.75 Generally, however,
discretionary conduct refers only to decisions involving questions of
policy.76 Operational conduct, in contrast, refers to decisions made in
the routine, day-to-day activities of governmental agencies. 77 Thus,
while decisions made at the operational level involve the exercise of
some discretion, they do not involve the type of discretion which is
exempted under the FTCA.
78
The discretionary function distinction is best illustrated by the de-
cisions in the great number of cases brought against the United States
for the negligence of air traffic controllers.79 The leading case, Eastern
74. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
75. See Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713,723 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
923 (1962); Wenninger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499, 503 (D. Del. 1964), af7'd, 352 F.2d
523 (3d Cir. 1965). While portions of the Dalehite opinion are no longer controlling, having
been rejected by Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957), and Indian Tow-
ing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955), the planning-operational distinction re-
mains and figures prominently in the FTCA cases. See generally Kennelly, Liability of the
United States Under the Federal Tort Claims Act-Some Comments Regarding Discretionary
Function, Postal Matters & Intentional Tort Defenses, 21 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 379 (1977).
76. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 73-78 (D.C. Cir. 1955); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 937 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROS-
SER].
77. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 73-78 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
PROSSER, supra note 76, at 937.
78. In United Airlines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 379
U.S. 951 (1964), the court noted the types of conduct which have been held to be discretion-
ary: "Discretionary to undertake fire-fighting, lighthouse, rescue, or wrecked-ship marking
services, but not discretionary to conduct such operations negligently, discretionary to admit
a patient to an army hospital, but not discretionary to treat the patient in a negligent man-
ner, discretionary to establish a post office at a particular location, but not to negligently fail
to install hand rails, discretionary to establish control towers at airports and to undertake air
traffic separation, but not to conduct the same negligently, discretionary to reactivate an
airbase, but not to construct a drainage and disposal system thereon in a negligent fashion,
and discretionary for CAA to conduct a survey in low-flying, twin-engine airplane, but not
for pilots thereof to fly negligently." Id. at 393.
79. No airworthiness certification case has dealt with the discretionary function defense
in detail. Arney and Rapp, as discussed previously, were brought under the Suits in Admi-
ralty Act rather than the FTCA, and for this reason the FTCA defenses of discretionary
function and misrepresentation were not discussed. See notes 10, 54, 64 supra.
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Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co.,80 involved a consolidation of wrongful
death actions arising out of an Eastern Airlines jet crash. The Eastern
jet had been cleared for landing and was on its final approach to Wash-
ington National Airport when it was struck by a P-38 fighter jet. The
controller, intending only to give clearance to the P-38 for a final ap-
proach, inadvertently cleared both planes to land at the same time.
The court ruled that while the promulgation by the government of
landing clearance procedures in the ATCPM required the exercise of
discretion, the individual instances of granting clearance to land were
operational. 81 The government therefore was held liable for the negli-
gent abuse of the procedures by the employee-controller.
82
Another illustration of the discretionary function distinction is
found in United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener.83 Wiener involved a mid-air
collision between a United Airlines DC-7 airplane and a United States
Air Force F-100F jet fighter. There were no survivors. Air Force per-
sonnel had been performing extensive training maneuvers in the area
and had complied with their regulations calling for notification of the
CAA of any such activity.8 4 The jet fighter was executing a simulated
instrument-approach landing which brought it into the commercial
route. The court held that the failure of the CAA to inform United of
the details of the hazardous Air Force training activity was negligence
at the operational level.85 While the regulations calling for notification
by the CAA of any such activity were promulgated as the result of a
discretionary or planning activity, individual instances of notification
by the appropriate CAA controllers were merely operational tasks.
Control tower negligence cases also have involved the failure to
warn a pilot of dangerous conditions, such as jet wake turbulence and
80. 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S.
907 (1955).
81. See id. at 79.
82. Id. at 78. "The. . . [negligent acts] ... were not 'decisions responsibly made at a
planning level' and did not involve any consideration important to the practicability of the
Government's program of controlling air traffic at public airports. The tower operators ac-
ted, and failed to act, at an operational level." Id See also Teicher v. United States, [1978]
15 Av. L. REP. (CCH) T 17,583, holding that the FAA's creation of terminal control areas
and the implementation of operation procedures for them through letters of agreement be-
tween the FAA and the air carriers falls within the discretionary function.
83. 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
84. Id. at 396. The court affirmed, arguendo, the trial court's finding that the CAA had
knowledge of the training procedures, thereby shifting the focus of the case to the negligence
of the CAA in failing to warn United.
85. Id. at 397. The court relied on § 617.4(c) of the ATCPM which provided: "The
primary objective of the air traffic control service shall be to promote the safe, orderly and
expeditious movement of air traffic. This shall include:. . . (c) Assisting the person in com-
mand of an aircraft by providing such advice and information as may be useful for the safe
and efficient conduct of a flight." FEDERAL AvIATION ADMINISTRATION, AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROL PROCEDURES MANUAL § 617.4(c) (1961) (emphasis omitted).
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changing weather patterns. For example, in Furumizo v. United
States,8 6 the decedent was killed while piloting a small Piper airplane,
which was caught in the wake of the DC-8 jet followed at take-off. The
controller had given the decedent the mandatory "cautionary informa-
tion" prescribed in the ATCPM to the effect that a lighter plane should
wait for the dissipation of a turbulent jet wake,87 but the novice pilot
began to take off anyway. The controller, although aware that the de-
cedent had disregarded the warning, did nothing to stop the take-off.88
The court interpreted "cautionary information" to require a second
warning from a controller once it became apparent that the first was
inadequate. 89 Thus, the procedures established by the FAA again were
construed to establish only a minimum standard of care. The court,
however, did not require air traffic controllers to formulate their own
warning policy.90 Rather, the court found an element of reasonable-
ness implicit in the FAA regulations, and held that a controller's re-
sponsibility to give another warning was merely an operational task.91
While many courts have ruled similarly on the meaning of the dis-
cretionary activity exemption, there is a paucity of cases treating the
issue in the context of the FAA airworthiness certification program.
Three reasons account for this fact. First, the leading airworthiness
certification cases, Rapp92 and Arney,9 3 both were brought under the
Suits in Admiralty Act,94 to which FTCA exceptions are inapplicable.
95
86. 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965), ard, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967).
87. Id. at 988, 1000. "When controllers foresee the possibility that departing or arriv-
ing aircraft might encounter [turbulence] from preceding aircraft, cautionary information to
this effect should be issued to pilots concerned." FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES MANUAL § 411.7 (1961).
88. 245 F. Supp. at 988-89, 992, 1011, 1012.
89. Id. at 1012 ("discretion and judgment should have been exercised by the controllers
to avoid this acute and obvious hazard. .. beyond giving the stereotyped routine caution-
ary language"). See note 48 supra.
90. Id. at 997. The court cited Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir.), qf'd sub noa. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955). For a
discussion of the conclusion in Eastern Air Lines that negligence occurred at the operational
level, see note 82 & accompanying text supra.
91. 245 F. Supp. at 997.
92. See text accompanying notes 54-63 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
94. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976).
95. The Suits in Admiralty Act provides the exclusive remedy against the United States
for a maritime tort, when the situs of the tort is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the court.
Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 577 (1943). Thus, if an action involves a maritime
tort and the jurisdiction is in admiralty, the FTCA has no application. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d)
(1976); Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1059, 1066-68 (1962). Wrongful death actions arising out of the
same crash as the Rapp lawsuit were held to be within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States in Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963). However,
in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), the Supreme Court
rejected the notion that claims arising out of airplane accidents on navigable waters are
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Second, the misrepresentation defense 96 has emerged as a more viable
defense for the government. 97 Finally, the logic of the court's decision
in Hoffman v. United States98 seemingly has eliminated the discretion-
ary function defense as a practical alternative. Nevertheless, the discre-
tionary function defense warrants discussion here because
commentators persist in advocating its application to the airworthiness
certification problem.99
In Hoffman v. United Statest"" the court ruled that the discretion-
ary function defense was inapplicable to a claim charging the FAA
with ignoring one of its regulations governing the issuance of an Air
Taxi/Commercial Operator (ATCO) certificate. The regulations pre-
scribed, inter alia, that eligibility for an ATCO certificate and appropri-
ate operations specifications depended upon holding "such economic
authority as may be required by the Civil Aeronautics Board."'' ° The
CAB requires an operator to carry at least $75,000 liability insurance
per passenger for bodily injury or death.' 0 2 The FAA knew that the
applicant in Hoffman had not complied with the insurance require-
ment. Nevertheless, pursuant to a prior FAA intra-agency memoran-
dum 10 3 instructing FAA field personnel not to deny applications
merely on the basis of the failure to meet the insurance requirement,
the FAA issued the ATCO certificate.
The plaintiff argued that the FAA was bound to adhere to the gov-
ernment standards established by its own regulations and emphasized
that the statute contained no provision for informal FAA amendment
to the regulations. The government contended that the decision by a
senior FAA official formulating a national policy concerning the altera-
tion of a federal statute was purely a discretionary act. 1°4 The court,
finding in plaintiffs favor, ruled that FAA failure to abide by its regu-
lations before granting ATCO certification was negligent conduct. '0°5
The court in Hoffman relied upon three cases in deciding that cer-
tification in contravention of regulations falls outside the discretionary
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, thereby eliminating the Suits in Ad-
miralty Act as a basis for jurisdiction in such cases.
96. See notes 118-59 & accompanying text infra.
97. The misrepresentation defense has been raised in the latest certification appeal,
United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, Civ. No. 70-138 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1975), appeal
docketed, No. 76-2813-17 (9th Cir. July 30, 1975), to the exclusion of the discretionary func-
tion defense.
98. 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See text accompanying notes 100-13 infra.
99. Harrison & Kolczynski, supra note 28, at 34-38.
100. 398 F. Supp. 530, 539 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
101. 14 C.F.R. § 135.15(b) (1978); 398 F. Supp. at 532.
102. 14 C.F.R. § 298.42(a)(1) (1978); 398 F. Supp. at 532.
103. FAA Notice 8430.120; 398 F. Supp. at 532.
104. 398 F. Supp. at 532. See also Harrison & Kolczynski, supra note 28, at 36-37.
105. 398 F. Supp. at 534.
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function exception. The first of these cases, Marr v. United States,
10 6
rejected the government's contention that the task of implementing es-
tablished regulations for licensing pilots and aircraft was discretionary
per se, noting that in some instances carrying out the regulations could
be considered operational.10 7 The second case, Coastwise Packet Co. v.
United States, 10 8 established that government licensing will be consid-
ered operational if nothing more than the matching of facts against a
clear rule or standard is involved. 0 9 The third case relied upon by the
Hoffinan court was Hendry v. United States, 10 which noted a distinc-
tion between two types of licensing and certification cases-those
which involved discretionary activity and those which did not."' The
court interpreted the rulings of Dalehite and its progeny as insulating
from liability "those decisions which either establish a rule for future
governmental behavior or constitute an ad hoc determination which
neither applies an existing rule nor establishes one for future cases."" 
2
106. 307 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Okla. 1969).
107. Id. at 931. The CAB was sued for negligence in the issuance of a certificate of
convenience and necessity to an air transportation carrier, and a pilot's license to a particu-
lar applicant. The court ruled: "The establishment of requirements for pilots and aircrafts
[sic] and of methods for determining whether those requirements have been met, and the
providing of landing systems and communication and weather information facilities, are
discretionary functions of government. But the carrying out of those requirements and
methods in some instances may not be discretionary, and it is in this respect that the plaintiff
claims the government was negligent . . . ." Id. The court went on to dismiss the com-
plaint, ruling that the plaintiff's allegations fell within the discretionary exception, because
they all related to the planning level of government. The one allegation which appeared to
be operational, that the CAB had chartered and then failed to suspend the airline, after
notification of the airline's laxity in providing liability insurance for the airline's crews, was
dismissed without comment. The case was important to the court in Hoffman, however, for
the proposition that the carrying out of promulgated requirements is not discretionary per
se.
108. 398 F.2d 77 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1968).
109. The plaintiff brought suit against the Coast Guard for its delay in granting a certifi-
cate of inspection, alleging that the standards imposed were unreasonably severe and negli-
gently applied. Id. at 78. Although the court held that the Coast Guard's actions were
within the discretionary function exception, their rationale provided the court in Hoffman
with the following test: "[P]laintiff's is not a case where there was a single, known, objective
standard which, because of administrative negligence, the Coast Guard failed to apply. In
such an area there might be questions. When no standard exists, then the process of certify-
ing, insofar as it involves groping for a standard, is within the discretionary exemption of the
Act. . .. [Trhis is not a case where plaintiffs property suffered damage from the negligent
performance of an act the Coast Guard had undertaken after policy had been established."
Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added).
110. 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
111. Id. at 782.
112. Id. at 783. In Hendry, a ship's officer sued the Coast Guard for wrongfully with-
holding issuance of his license based upon an allegedly erroneous determination by the
United States Public Health Service that he was psychologically unfit for sea duty. Id. at
777. The district court dismissed the action based on the discretionary function exception.
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Applying these standards, the court in Hoffman concluded:
While the court believes that the granting or denial of a license or
certificate usually entails some amount of discretion, this is not nec-
essarily so in all cases, particularly. . . [where the regulation involved]
presents clear standards to be applied to fact situations in order to de-
termine basic el'gibility. Application of this regulation is done after
the planning, or discretionary, stage-at the operational level ...
A claim of negligence. . . in the application of this regulation would
render the government liable. While the. . . cases generally involve
a refusal to grant a license, the same principles apply to an allegedly
wrongful decision to grant the license.'"
3
The process of matching clear standards to the results of inspec-
tion and testing is exactly what is involved in airworthiness certifica-
tion. Standards are set out in great detail in the Code of Federal
Regulations.' 14 Unquestionably, the promulgation of the regulations
governing the issuance of airworthiness certificates by the FAA is the
result of planning or discretionary activity. Only the application of the
rules by the FAA field inspectors and FAA delegates during the actual
The Second Circuit affirmed because it found no basis for a finding of negligence on the part
of the government's doctors, but strongly disagreed as to the applicability of the discretion-
ary function defense. The court outlined several factors to be considered in determining if
conduct is discretionary: first, whether the grant of a license depends on a readily asertain-
able rule or standard (the rule of Coastwide Packet, 277 F. Supp. 920 (D. Mass. 1968));
second, whether the complaint attacks the nature of the rules promulgated, or the way in
which the rules are applied (a restatement of Dalehite); and third, whether the deci-
sionmaker looks to considerations of public policy. 418 F.2d at 783. Finally, the court in
Hendry questioned whether the governing statutes and regulations appeared to convey dis-
cretion to identify and consider public safety goals, and held that they did not. Id.
113. 398 F. Supp. at 539 (emphasis added). The court in Hoffman dealt with the FAA
interagency memo, which instructed FAA field personnel to ignore the Federal Aviation
Regulation provision, by classifying the action as one against the FAA for failing to apply
the promulgated regulation, rather than as an action against the FAA questioning the valid-
ity of the decision promulgating the memo, which was, admittedly, a discretionary function.
Harrison and Kolczynski accuse the court of "glossing over" the import of the memo, sug-
gesting FAA immunity because it was handed down by a senior FAA official. Harrison &
Kolczynski, supra note 28, at 37. The court found this argument irrelevant, because the
FAA had no authority to amend the regulation by this informal method. The court thus
dealt with the sole issue of the liability of a federal agency which did not carry out its own
established regulations. The fact that an agency employee happens to be a senior official
does not result in a privilege to disregard the rules designed to govern the agency. Whether
an activity is classified as operational or discretionary depends not on who performs it, but
rather on the type of activity which is performed. To argue that because an activity is per-
formed by a senior official it is discretionary per se is to ignore completely the meaning of
the case law beginning with Dalehite. The FAA is charged with certifying an aircraft, and it
must follow the federal regulations promulgated for that purpose. If the regulations are
violated, it does not matter who violates them, whether it be an FAA field inspector or a
senior official. If the FAA could change its governing regulations at its will, the regulations
would be rendered meaningless. It follows that the FAA cannot escape liability by classify-
ing operational activity as discretionary.
114. See note 12 supra.
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certification of an airplane or component is an operational activity.115
If, however, the regulations had not prescribed a particular test, even
one which would have prevented harm, the government would be im-
mune from liability.11 6 Thus, the discretionary function exception can-
not be considered a viable defense for the government in negligent
certification actions in which applicable regulations are contravened.
The FAA's violation of standards and specifications established by its
own regulations involves, not discretion, but abuse for which the gov-
ernment can and should be held liable.'
17
115. This analysis apparently finds support in the unreported case, Ciccarelli v. United
States, Civ. No. 5-1940 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 1972). See note 64 supra. This is the only airwor-
thiness certification action dealing directly with the discretionary function exception. The
plaintiffs alleged that the FAA inspectors negligently violated the FARs in the issuance of
Type, Production, and Airworthiness Certificates. The court addressed the applicability of
the discretionary function defense, and held that airworthiness certification was an opera-
tional activity.
116. This is the principle of "regulatory adjudication," which states that an unfair or
otherwise inadequate regulation may not serve as a basis for a tort claim, because the pro-
mulgation of regulations is classic discretionary activity. Harrison & Kolczynski, supra note
28, at 26-28. See note 117 infra.
117. In their article, Harrison and Kolczynski suggest that when an FAA official certifies
an airplane as airworthy, the certification is in fact a "regulatory adjudication." Harrison &
Kolczynski, supra note 28, at 26-28. They argue that because of the separation of powers
between the courts and the administrative agencies, and because the granting of a license or
certificate is the exercise of an agency's quasi-judicial function, the agency's decision should
not be reviewed by the courts. Id. at 26-27. Allegedly, the FAA, by its technical expertise, is
particularly well-equipped to handle the certification process, as compared to the court
whose retroactive determination of whether an aircraft was properly certified would be im-
proper and unfair. Id. at 43-45. The position is untenable for a number of reasons.
First, the statement of the issue erroneously implies that the process of "regulatory ad-
judication" is yet another exception to the FTCA. In fact, it is nothing more than another
application of the discretionary function exception. For example, in Dalehite the Court,
interpreting FTCA § 2680(a), stated: "It will be noted from the form of the section. . . that
there are two phrases describing the excepted acts of government employees. The first deals
with acts or omissions of government employees, exercising due care in carrying out statutes
or regulations whether valid or not. It bars tests by tort action o/the legality of statutes and
regulations. The second is applicable in this case. It excepts acts of discretion in the per-
formance of governmental functions or duty 'whether or not the discretion be abused.' Not
only agencies of government are covered but all employees exercising discretion." 346 U.S.
at 32-33 (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra. Thus, the decision
whether or not "regulatory adjudication" is involved depends entirely upon a finding that
there is a discretionary function exercised. The basic notion of regulatory adjudication is
that while the agency's discretionary decision-for example, the promulgation of regula-
tions-is only reviewable by injunction, mandamus, or declaratory judgment for an abuse of
a discretionary function; such an abuse does not furnish a basis for a tort claim under the
FTCA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941,
948 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Thus, application of the term "regulatory adjudication" adds nothing
to the previous discussion of the discretionary function exception.
Second, the Administrative Procedures Act, upon which "regulatory adjudication"' is
based, deals only with equitable actions against an abusive exercise of a discretionary func-
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The Misrepresentation Defense
The other major defense raised by the government, the misrepre-
sentation exception to FTCA liability, provides that the FTCA limited
waiver of sovereign immunity shall not apply to "[any claims arising
out of. . .misrepresentation."' 1 8 The courts have construed the term
"misrepresentation" according to "the traditional and commonly un-
derstood legal definition of the tort,"'l 9 and have thereby excluded
claims arising out of negligent as well as intentional misrepresenta-
tion.' 20 However, because an overly broad interpretation of the mis-
representation defense might exclude familiar forms of negligent
conduct, 12 courts have developed a logical limitation on the use of the
tion. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat.
237 (1946)). For example, if a particular certification regulation was thought to be inade-
quate, or otherwise unfair, one might file suit against the FAA under the Administrative
Procedures Act for judicial review of the regulation, possibly compelling the FAA to change
the regulation. However, one could not sue the FAA in tort for damages resulting from the
application of the inadequate regulations. Again, using the familar facts of Rapp for illus-
tration, if the government had not required a "bird test" before the issuance of the type
certificate, and the plane had crashed, and it was later established that had the government
required a bird test the accident could have been prevented, there would be no action cogni-
zable against the FAA, because its decision not to require a bird test was discretionary.
Finally, the very rationale provided by Harrison and Kolczynski states: "Since Con-
gress has given the FAA the primary jurisdiction to regulate and to certificate aircraft, it is
improper for the district courts to arrogate to themselves the adjudicative function (which
includes technical expertise as well as discretion) of retroactively determining whether an
aircraft was properly certificated." Harrison & Kolczynski, supra, note 28 at 43. One need
only examine the numerous examples of FAA negligence found in this Note to refute the
extreme contention that FAA activities ought to stand beyond the scope of judicial review.
Immunity from judicial review might ease the burden on FAA counsel, but it would offend
the basic notions of fairness that the injured party recover damages for injury caused by the
negligence of another.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
119. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 706 (1961); Fitch v. United States, 513
F.2d 1013, 1015 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). Finding a "commonly understood" legal definition is
no small task. According to Dean Prosser, the evolution of the tort of misrepresentation is
entangled with the tort of deceit, and confusion of the two theories is "increased by the
indiscriminate use of the word 'fraud,' a term so vague that it requires definition in nearly
every case." PROSSER, supra note 76, at 684. While the courts have plunged forward in their
task of construction, it is useful to heed Prosser's warning that "[a]ny attempt to bring order
out of the resulting chaos must be at best a tentative one, with the qualification that many
courts do not agree." Id. at 685. The Second Restatement of Torts has two sections defining
negligent misrepresentation: § 552 covers pecuniary loss, and § 311 covers physical injury.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 311, 552 (1964).
120. Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013, 1015, (citing United States v. Neustadt, 366
U.S. 696, 706 (1961); Annot., 30 A.L.R. Fed. 421 (1976)).
121. Prosser noted that a great many of the common and familiar forms of negligent
conduct are essentially nothing more than misrepresentation. PROSSER, supra note 76, at
683. A familiar and oft-quoted example of this is the misleading turn signal given by the
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defense. This limitation recognizes the distinction between actions
based on governmental negligence resulting in death or injury,122 and
those involving monetary loss from business transactions.1 23 In the
death and injury cases, the misrepresentation defense has not been suc-
cessful, while in business loss actions it has.
The leading case interpreting the misrepresentation defense is
United States v. Neustadt, 2 4 in which the Supreme Court held that the
misrepresentation defense barred a claim by a purchaser of a home
who, in reliance upon a negligent inspection and appraisal by Federal
Housing Administration personnel, had been induced to pay more for
the property than it was actually worth.'25 The Court ruled that eco-
nomic loss suffered in reliance upon a negligent government inspection
and appraisal is not actionable under the FTCA:
To say ... that a claim arises out of "negligence," rather than "mis-
representation," when the loss suffered by the injured party is caused
by the breach of a "specific duty" owed by the government to him,
ie., the duty to use due care in obtaining and communicating infor-
mation upon which that party may reasonably be expected to rely in
the conduct of his economic affairs, is only to state the traditional and
commonly understood legal definitions of the tort of negligent mis-
representation .... 126
driver of an automobile about to turn the other way. To suggest that the driver who made
the erroneous turn signal "misrepresented," in the tort sense, his true intention is unreasona-
ble. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 711 n.26 (1961). In Neustadt, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its decision in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955),
which held cognizable a FTCA claim for property damages suffered when a vessel ran
aground as the result of the Coast Guard's allegedly negligent failure to maintain the beacon
lamp in a light house. The court in Neustadt emphasized that "[s]uch a claim does not 'arise
out of. . . misrepresentation,' any more than does one based upon a motor vehicle opera-
tor's negligence in giving a misleading turn signal." 366 U.S. at 711 n.26. The court in
Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931
(1967), feared this unreasonable interpretation of "misrepresentation" and expressly warned
of the danger of a too-broad construction of the misrepresentation defense.
122. This injurious reliance on misrepresentations distinction between actions in con-
tract and actions in tort continues to be maintained in the law. A leading example is Justice
Traynor's opinion in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965), emphasizing that strict products liability, a tort action, has no application to cases of
purely economic loss, which sound in warranty and contract. See notes 134-45 & accompa-
nying text infra.
123. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 73 (1973).
See notes 146-59 & accompanying text infra.
124. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
125. Id. at 697-98.
126. Id. at 706 (emphasis added). The Neusiad court cited as authority for their defini-
tion of negligent misrepresentation the Restatement of Torts § 522, which states: "One who
in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions is subject to liability . . . ." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 522
(1938). The court noted Prosser's observation that "[s]o far as misrepresentation has been
treated as giving rise in and of itself to a distinct cause of action in tort," it had been con-
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The Supreme Court clearly limited its decision to the use of the
misrepresentation defense in cases involving economic loss. 127 Cases
successfully involving the rule of Neustadt, however, have gone beyond
the area of negligent inspection and appraisal of buildings dealt with in
Neustadt, and now include negligent food testing, 128 weather forecast-
ing,' 29 and farm animal testing, 130 wrongful induction into the armed
forces,' 3 ' and actions for indemnity or contribution by an aviation
manufacturer against the government for negligent certification. 132 On
the other hand, the misrepresentation defense never has been asserted
successfully as a bar to recovery in a suit for wrongful death or per-
sonal injury in an aviation disaster.
33
The first aviation case in which the misrepresentation defense was
asserted was Wenninger v. United States, 34 in which the United States
was sued for the death of the pilot of a small Piper Tri-Pacer. The
Piper crashed after encountering trailing vortex turbulence generated
by a United States C-124 military airplane flying out of Dover Air
Force Base.' 35 The commander at Dover and the CAA were found
fined "very largely to the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character, in the
course of business dealings." 366 U.S. 696 at 711 n.26 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 702, 703 (1st ed. 1941)). However, the Second Restatement of Torts
§ 311 includes negligent misrepresentation involving the risk of physical harm. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1964). In Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 429 F. Supp. 181,
187 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), § 311 is cited as applicable to the conduct of the federal government.
Section 311 was first applied to a lawsuit against the government in Kommanvittselskapet
Harwi (R. Wigand) v. United States, 467 F.2d 456, 459 n.4, 464 n.10 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). This section apparently will encompass misrepresentation by
the federal government which causes physical injury. This Note contends, however, that
airworthiness certification can not be a misrepresentation, because there is no communica-
tion between the FAA and the typical airline passenger upon which reliance can be based.
See text accompanying notes 153-61 infra.
127. Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
931 (1967).
128. Mizokami v. United States, 414 F.2d 1375 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
129. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
967 (1954); see also Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954).
130. Rey v. United States, 484 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1973); Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69
(10th Cir. 1959); Bartie v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. La. 1963), a 'd, 326 F.2d
754 (5th Cir. 1964) (court refrained from passing on the issue of liability under § 2680(h)).
131. Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
See Reamer v. United States, 459 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1972).
132. Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
133. While Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), has been
cited by the government as a successful assertion of the misrepresentation defense against a
claim arising out of an aviation disaster, the suit against the government was a third party
suit for indemnity or contribution. It did not test the defense as asserted directly against the
plaintiff victim. See notes 154-59 & accompanying text infra.
134. 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964), a f'd, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965).
135. Id. at 517. Vortex turbulence is the turbulence induced by the wings moving
through the air, depressing the air behind them and producing a cornucopia of rotating air
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negligent in failing to warn civilian flyers in the area that the military
planes were using the same navigational radio beam 36 as the civilians,
thus exposing them to a risk of harm.
1 37
Although the plaintiffs specifically based their claim upon the gov-
ernment's misrepresentation of the airway as safe, 138 the court ex-
amined the character of the conduct and rejected the government's
claim that the misrepresentation defense deprived the court of jurisdic-
tion: 139
A failure to warn of an existing danger, when a duty to do so exists, is
in a sense, an implicit assertion that there is no danger. For some
purposes, at least, this may be properly characterized as a misrepre-
sentation. This is not the type of misrepresentation, however, that
§ 2680(h) was intended to cover. This is made clear by the comments
in United States v. Neustadt. ... Section 2680(h) does not deprive
the Court of jurisdiction.
140
The misrepresentation defense was raised again in Ingham v. East-
ern Airlines, Inc. 141 In dismissing the defense, the court reasoned that
although the controller's failure to communicate up-to-date weather in-
formation technically could be considered a misrepresentation that the
weather had not worsened, "the government's reading of the misrepre-
sentation exception is much too broad, for it would exempt from tort
liability any operational malfunction by the government that involved
communications in any form."' 42 The court cited the oft-quoted pas-
sage limiting the decision in Neustadt to cases involving "invasion of
interests of a financial or commercial character in the course of busi-
ness dealings,"' 143 and concluded that "[w]here the gravamen of the
complaint is the negligent performance of operational tasks, rather
behind each wing. The rotation of the air is called the vortex, and the vortex is the cause of
the turbulence. The combined effect of the vortex behind each wing can be analogized to
the wake pattern of a high speed motor boat. This pattern of turbulence trails invisibly
behind every large jet aircraft.
136. At the time of the accident, the pilot-decedent was flying in the center of Victor 16,
the standard route for northeast-southwest bound traffic. These planes used as a naviga-
tional aid a radio beam transmitted from the Kenton VOR (visual omni-directional radio
range station). A VOR serves as a reference point for an airplane trying to get to an airport
in the vicinity of the VOR as well as a navigational aid to airplanes en route to another
destination. The Kenton VOR was seven miles north of Dover, and the C-124s from Dover
had been crossing Victor 16 from all directions in connection with their use of the VOR as a
navigational aid, for practice instrument procedures. Id. at 501-02.
137. Id. at 517.
138. Id. at 505.
139. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) (jurisdiction); FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). When the government's conduct falls within one of the exceptions to the
FTCA, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
140. 234 F. Supp. at 505.
141. 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
142. Id. at 239.
143. Id. See note 126 supra.
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than misrepresentation, the government may not rely upon § 2680(h) to
absolve itself of liability." 144 Thus, as early as 1967, the courts had
established that the misrepresentation exception was not a valid de-
fense where the loss was other than economic, or where the essence of
the asserted complaint sounded in negligence, rather than misrepresen-
tation. 145
Whenever the government has asserted the misrepresentation de-
fense in aviation cases involving economic loss, however, it has been
successful. An example is found in Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc.,146 in
which an airplane purchaser brought an action to recover damages
from the defendant seller because of the latter's misrepresentation and
breach of implied warranties. The defendant filed a third party com-
plaint against the United States under the FTCA, on the theory that
defendant's statements to the plaintiff concerning the condition of the
aircraft were made in reliance upon the FAA inspector's certification of
airworthiness. The court carefully distinguished cases involving an al-
legation of negligent conduct from cases involving negligent "misrepre-
sentation," and concluded that the misrepresentation defense was
applicable.
147
In each of the leading cases applying the defense, the cause of ac-
tion arose directly from reliance on the communication of certain erro-
neous facts, not from situations in which the misrepresentation was
merely incidental to the negligent conduct, 148 as in Ingham and Wie-
ner. The court in Marival concluded that the negligence of the inspec-
tors was purely secondary, for it was the misrepresentation of the
aircraft's condition upon which defendants relied in their commercial
transaction with the plaintiff. 149 The defendant's third party complaint
144. 373 F.2d at 239. In United Air Lines, Inc., v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), the Ninth Circuit similarly rejected the misrepresentation
defense, by construing the gist of the complaint: "Here, the gravamen of the action is not
misrepresentation but the negligent performance of operational tasks, although such negli-
gence consisted partly of a failure of a duty to warn." Id. at 398. The court realized that it
would be illogical to equate the failure to warn of an existing danger with the misrepresenta-
tion of a material fact.
145. See Murray v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1971), where government-
published aeronautical charts which falsely indicated that runway lighting was available at
Bryce Canyon, Utah, were held not to be a "mere misrepresentation" to the pilot-decedent
who, while waiting for the lights to illuminate, crashed in his plane. The wrongful death
recovery was allowed.
146. 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
147. The court questioned "whether the third-party complaint is founded upon an alle-
gation of negligent inspection of the aircraft or negligent misrepresentation, through a certif-
icate that the aircraft was airworthy." The court concluded that "an analysis will show that
defendant's complaint and hopes for recovery are bottomed upon negligent misrepresenta-
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did not seek to recover damages for any direct injuries flowing from the
negligent inspection, but rather involved an attempt to use the negli-
gent certification as a basis for indemnity.150 Significantly, the court
relied upon the facts of Rapp' 5 1 to furnish an example of direct injury
from a negligent certification. Thus, in dismissing the case against the
government, the court in Marival held that this was "a classic example
of detrimental reliance upon an allegedly negligent misrepresentation
in a commercial transaction. It was precisely this type of action, in-
volving direct reliance on governmental communication of facts, rather
than direct injury from negligent conduct, which § 2680(h) was
designed to meet."'
152
In certification cases, the courts similarly have permitted the mis-
representation defense in those actions in which the manufacturer tries
to escape its own obligation by bringing a third party action against the
government, asserting that they would not have released the plane but
for the government's approval of the airplane as airworthy. 53 The
manufacturer's claim is all the more untenable in certification actions
because of the FAA's delegated authorization system in which the
manufacturer is substantially involved in the airworthiness certifica-
tion.' 54 For example, in Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,155 the court held
150. Id. at 860. The third party complaint stated: "Defendant shows that it acted at all
times in reliance upon the certification by [FAA inspector] William W. Cook that the air-
craft was airworthy; that if it should be found liable to plaintiff for any representations or
express or implied warranties concerning the airworthiness of the aircraft, said representa-
tions or warranties, if any, were made in reliance on said airworthiness certification issued
by the said William W. Cook; that if the aircraft is unairworthy, the said William W. Cook,
Jr. did negligently make the said annual inspection and did negligently certify the aircraft
was airworthy."
151. See notes 1, 54-63 & accompanying text supra.
152. 306 F. Supp. at 860.
153. Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
154. Collins, Calling It Safe: A Hard Look at Certffcation, 92 FLYING, January 1973, at
73. Collins notes: "The FAA mostly relies on the manufacturer's statements that an air-
plane meets the standards for certification before it issues the certificate." Id. The Act per-
mits the delegation of the examination, inspection and testing necessary to the issuance of
certification, to any properly qualified person, or his employee. 49 U.S.C. § 1355(a) (1976).
There are three types of delegation. "Delegation Option Authority" allows the Administra-
tor to delegate the responsibility to test and determine conformity with the small-airplane
certification regulations to the manufacturers themselves. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.231-.293 (1978).
The "Designated Engineering Representatives" program allows the Administrator to dele-
gate certification authorization to specialists in the different manufacturing fields, such as
powerplant, airframe, systems and equipment, and flight test, in order to simplify the certifi-
cation of larger, more complex equipment. These specialists, who are employed directly by
the manufacturers, approve the manufacture of the airplanes under the regulations pre-
scribed by the FAA. 14 C.F.R. § 183.29 (1978). Manufacturers may also employ "Desig-
nated Manufacturing Inspection Representatives" who are permitted to issue Airworthiness
Certificates when they inspect an airplane and find it in conformity with the regulations. 14
C.F.R. § 21.3 (1978).
that the manufacturer's claim for indemnity or contribution against the
government, based on the FAA's negligence in inspecting and testing
the aircraft prior to certification, was barred by the misrepresentation
exception. 156 The court paticularly relied on the unreported case of
Bibbig v. United States. 157
In Bibbig the plaintiff sought damages for the crash of a motorized
glider which allegedly had been inspected negligently and issued an
Airworthiness Certificate by the FAA.' 58 The government asserted the
misrepresentation defense, and the court granted the government's mo-
tion for summary judgment. 59 The court's opinion in Lloyd empha-
sizes the fact that "explicitly rejected [in Bibbig] was the plaintiff's
contention that cases in which the misrepresentation [defense] was ap-
plied to a commercial setting were irrelevant to the facts of such law-
suit." ' 60 The court in Lloyd apparently was seeking justification for its
approval of the misrepresentation defense despite the fact that the de-
fense had never barred recovery in an air disaster. The court, however,
overlooked an important distinction: In Marival and Lloyd, the party
against whom the defense was successfully asserted had been involved
directly with the government. In Marival, the injured party was the
seller of an airplane who had made warranties after the FAA had certi-
fied his airplane. In Lloyd, the manufacturer was, in fact, barred from
recovery in an indemnity action, ostensibly because it was directly in-
volved with the FAA through delegated certification procedures.
In contrast, the misrepresentation defense has never been used to
bar the claim of a party injured in another's aircraft. Unlike the air-
plane manufacturer, or the owner of an airplane, the typical airplane
passenger has no contact with the FAA, and therefore any communica-
tion by which a misrepresentation could be transmitted is difficult to
find. And, assuming arguendo that there is some communication, the
substance of the alleged false representation is similarly difficult to im-
agine. While the public is no doubt aware that the aviation industry is
highly regulated, in all probability few persons who are the passengers
of commercial aviation have even heard of airworthiness certification,
much less rely on it before stepping into an airplane:
People have never flown airplanes because they are safe. They fly
them because they are fast, or they fly them because they are fun.
When the current procedures and rules started to evolve 25 years
ago, the fast-and-fun part was all that counted. People still fly be-
cause it is fast and fun, and not because it is safe, but they do expect
155. 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
156. Id. at 182.
157. Civ. No. C-4604 (D. Colo., filed May 3, 1973).
158. 429 F. Supp. at 186.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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the product-the airplane-to meet a very high standard as far as
safety potential goes.'
61
Individual instances of negligent certification cannot be classified as
misrepresentations to the unfortunate passengers of the doomed flight.
Conclusion
Public policy and traditional tort law principles preclude the gov-
ernment, which has assumed the responsibility of regulating aviation
safety, from insulating itself from liability for the failure of its agents or
employees to implement the strict regulations which the FAA has
promulgated to insure that only airworthy planes are flying. The plain-
tiff who sues the government for negligent certification typically has
encountered three defenses under the FAA. First, the government at-
tempts to avoid liability by claiming that the Act establishes no duty of
care toward individual members of the public, but rather is designed to
secure the safety of the public as a whole. The courts have rejected this
notion totally, holding that safety regulation by the FAA does give rise
to a cause of action in tort if such safety regulation is conducted negli-
gently. Second, the government argues that the process of certification
is a discretionary function which is shielded from liability by the most
popular exception to government liability under the FTCA. The
courts, however, have held that where the certification or licensing in-
volves the process of matching clear standards to the facts of the case,
the activity is to be considered merely operational, and thus not within
the discretionary function exception. Finally, the government claims
that airworthiness certification, if conducted negligently, is a mere mis-
representation of the condition of the airplane, and as such, is shielded
from liability under the FTCA misrepresentation exception. Lloyd v.
Cessna A ircraft Co.,162 however, has affirmed the distinction that the
misrepresentation defense can only be applied to cases involving either
an economic loss, or a direct communication between the plaintiff and
the government. Thus, an individual who suffers personal injury be-
cause of negligent certification should not be cut off from recovery.
The government is liable under the FTCA for negligent acts or
omissions of its agents whenever a private employer, under the same
circumstances, would be liable. Suit for negligent certification does not
attempt to hold the government liable for anything more than the neg-
ligence of its employees. It does not seek to make the FAA a guarantor
of the products used in air commerce, nor does it require absolute
safety. It does not even suggest that the standards promulgated by the
FAA be stringent enough to catch all errors and defects which, if de-
161. Collins, Calling It Safe: A Hard Look at Cert/fcatlon, 92 FLYING, January 1973, at
76.
162. 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); See notes 154-59 & accompanying text supra.
tected, might prevent the occurrence of an aviation disaster. Rather,
suit for negligent certification merely attempts to hold a negligent
tortfeasor liable for the damage which such negligence inflicts; the
FAA inspector who certificated an airplane which failed to conform to
federal standards. The principle of respondeat superior allows the vic-
tim to look to the inspector's employer-the federal government-for
compensation.
Of course, the manufacturer built the defective airplane, and the
manufacturer normally is held strictly liable for any dangerous defect.
Why, therefore, should recovery be allowed against the government?
Because, in the case of the negligently certificated airplane, the aviation
manufacturer is only one of two joint tortfeasors. The government, not
the manufacturer, places an airplane into the stream of commerce.
There has never been a rule of law whereby the government may es-
cape its liability merely because the plaintiff has the option of recover-
ing against another.
An airplane is not an automobile, or a boiler, or a lathe, or any of
the thousands of products upon which products liability actions tradi-
tionally are based. The airplane is unique, and recognizing this, the
government stringently regulates every phase of aircraft construction
and air transportation. It is neither reasonable nor realistic to suggest
that there is to be no recovery against the government when it is negli-
gent in this endeavor.
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